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                                                            NOT 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                          
 
                           No. 00-4415 
                                          
 
                     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
                                v. 
 
          DOE BOY a/k/a Clinton French a/k/a Christopher 
            Williams Clemons a/k/a Chris Clemons a/k/a 
                          Chris Collins 
 
       Christopher Williams Clemons, a/k/a "Chris Clemons," 
          a/k/a "Doe Boy," a/k/a "Clinton French," a/k/a 
                         "Chris Collins," 
                                         Appellant 
                                         
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of  Delaware 
                     (D.C. No. 99-cr-00082-1) 
            District Judge:  Hon. Roderick R. McKelvie 
                                         
 
            Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                         February 4, 2002 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge* 
                                  
                    (Filed: February 5, 2002) 
                                          
 





* Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of          
  Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
     Christopher Clemons, a/k/a Doe-Boy, appeals from his judgment of 
sentence and 
convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and carrying 
a firearm during 
a drug trafficking felony.  Clemons' counsel filed a vigorous brief which 
states it was 
filed under the aegis of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  He 
also filed a motion 
for leave to withdraw from representing Clemons, expressing counsel's 
belief that all of 
Clemons' grounds for appeal are frivolous.  Clemons, who was notified by 
this court of 
the opportunity to file a pro se brief, failed to do so.  Because 
counsel's brief did not 
explain why the arguments made are frivolous, this court asked counsel to 
explain further.  
Counsel then filed a reply brief, which states that the District Court 
neither erred nor 
abused its discretion as to the various issues raised in the principal 
brief.  After reviewing 
the various briefs, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence 
and grant 
counsel's motion to withdraw. 
                               I. 
     Clemons presents seven arguments.  He first argues that the District 
Court erred in 
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), because the indictment did not allege a specific weight 
of crack cocaine.  
In our recent en banc decision, United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93 (3d 
Cir. 2001), we 
held "that an Apprendi violation only occurs if the drug quantity is not 
found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant's sentence under  841 exceeds 
20 years."  
Id. at 98.  Clemons' sentence under  841 did not exceed twenty years.  
     Second, Clemons argues he should have been granted a new trial based 
on newly 
discovered evidence to the effect that he was searched without a warrant 
after he was 
arrested.  Searches conducted incident to a lawful arrest of a suspect's 
person and the area 
of his immediate control do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., 
Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983). 
     Third, Clemons argues the District Court erred in denying him a two 
level 
reduction in offense level for his acceptance of responsibility under 
U.S.S.G.  3E1.1(a).  
Clemons points us to no testimony or action reflecting an acceptance of 
responsibility.  
Given the "'great deference on review'" we accord to trial judges under  
3E1.1(a), this 
court discerns no error.  See United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 804 
(3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting U.S.S.G.  3E1.1 application note 5).  
     Fourth, Clemons argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss every 
sentencing enhancement under Apprendi because no prior drug felony 
convictions were 
alleged in the indictment, and the government did not prove any prior 
felony drug 
convictions at trial.  Where, as here, a defendant's ultimate sentence 
does not exceed the 
prescribed statutory maximum, a court need not enquire whether the 
enhanced sentence 
was based on the fact of a prior conviction.  United States v. Mack, 229 
F.3d 226, 238-39 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
     Fifth, Clemons argues he was entitled to notice of a sentencing 
enhancement 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C.  851(a)(1) for his prior felony convictions.  
However,  "when a 
defendant is not being sentenced pursuant to a  851 statutory enhancement 
i.e., one that 
exceeds the statutory maximum embodied in the Guideline's sentencing 
ranges the 
defendant is not entitled to rely on the procedural protections contained 
in  851."  United 
States v. Escobales, 218 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphases omitted).  
Clemons was 
not sentenced pursuant to a  851 statutory enhancement. 
     Sixth, Clemons argues the District Court abused its discretion by 
declining to 
depart downward based on Clemons' pretrial confinement at Gander Hill, a 
local 
Delaware prison, under allegedly substandard conditions.  We have held on 
numerous 
occasions that we are without jurisdiction to review discretionary 
refusals to depart 
downward where the district court "fully understood the scope of its 
discretion to depart 
from the Guidelines."  United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
     Seventh, Clemons argues the District Court erred in calculating 
Clemons' base 
offense on the basis of Clemons' possession of cocaine base, or "crack," 
rather than 
cocaine, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c) and the definition of cocaine base 
contained in 
Note D to that table.  Given the government chemist's testimony and the 
testimony of the 
drug officer, the District Court did not clearly err in determining the 
substance was 
cocaine base. 
                              II. 
     Convinced by the reasoning proffered in counsel's reply brief of the 
frivolity of 
Clemons' seven arguments, and having found no nonfrivolous issues for 
appeal upon our 
independent review, we will affirm the convictions and sentence of the 
District Court, and 
will grant counsel's motion to withdraw. 
____________________________ 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
                              Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
 
                                   /s/ Dolores K. Sloviter      
                              Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
